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TORTS-UNAUTHORIZED AUTOPSY-NoN-SURVIVAL OF ACTION-Plaintiff's
husband was struck and killed by a motorbus owned and operated by defendant municipality. The body was removed to a hospital maintained by
defendant. Subsequently, at the request and direction of a physician employed by defendant, an autopsy was performed, apparently to determine
whether the deceased had been drinking. During the examination certain
organs were removed and destroyed. Plaintiff brought an action for damages on the ground that the mutilation was done without her consent and
in violation of her legal right to the possession of the body. Plaintiff died
while the action was pending, and her administrator continued the suit.
Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied, and judgment and
verdict were for plaintiff. On appeal, held, reversed, with direction to set
aside and dismiss. While there is a cause of action in the surviving spouse
for unauthorized mutilation of her husband's body, it was error to deny
defendant's motion because such right did not survive the death of plaintiff. Deeg v. City of Detroit, 345 Mich. 371, 76 N.W. (2d) 16 (1956).
All American courts that have considered the question have recognized
that a cause of action lies for the intentional and unpermitted mutilation
of a corpse, and damages for mental anguish may be recovered.1 While

1 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); Simpkins v. Lumbermans Mut.
Casualty Co., 200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E. (2d) 733 (1942); Steagall v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.,
(D.C. Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 352. See generally 52 A.L.R. 1446 (1928); Weinmann, "A
Survey of the Law Concerning Dead Human Bodies," BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL
REsEARCH CouNCIL, No. 73 (1929). It is doubtful whether there may be recovery for
mental anguish for a mere negligent interference. See 12 A.L.R. 342 (1921); Green,
"Relational Interests," 29 ILL. L. R.Ev. 460 at 487 (1934).
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there is accord as to the existence of the right, the basis of the liability is not
clear. Most of the courts have described it as akin to a property right, 2
others have characterized it as a right to have the body delivered for burial
without mutilation, 3 while others have used combinations of both. 4 However, it is apparent that the courts recognize that such an act reasonably
and, indeed, normally causes real mental suffering and therefore are willing
to award compensation.5 The problem of who may maintain the action has
not been answered fully, though reliance on property considerations generally has led to the conclusion that the person entitled to the custody of
the body for burial may maintain the action. Such a right has been recognized in the surviving spouse, mother, father, or next of kin. 8 It is not clear
whether the right is held jointly by the survivors or exclusively by a particular individual, but it would appear doubtful that the right is held
severally.7 There is authority allowing members of the immediate family
to join in the action. 8 If the basis of the action, however, is a willful act
causing mental anguish, then it would seem that any survivor sufficiently related to the deceased to suffer mental anguish should have an individual
cause of action. The application of property concepts to determine who
may maintain the action is inconsistent with allowing compensation for
mental anguish, and can be justified only as a means of limiting the defendants' liability.0 The Michigan court appears to be the first to hold
that the action does not survive either at common law or under the Michigan type survival statute.10 This is in accord with the theory that the action
is based on the infringement of a personal right and is not related to any
2 For example, Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904), describes it as
property subject to a trust and limited in its rights. Mensinger v. O'Hara, 189 Ill. App.
48 (1914), recognizes a property right authorizing the nearest relatives to take possession
and control of the body for the purpose of burial.
8Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551, 37 N.Y.S. 471 (1896); Keyes v. Konkel, 119 Mich.
550, 78 N.W. 649 (1899) (dictum).
4 Patrick v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 251, 118 S.W. (2d)
116 (1938); Larson v. Chase, note 1 supra.
5 See Magruder, "Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts," 49
HARv. L. REv. 1033 at 1064 (1936); Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering:
A New Tort," 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 at 885 (1939).
6 Larson v. Chase, and Simpkins v. Lumbermans Mut. Casualty Co., both note 1 supra.
7 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933), noted
in 19 CoRN. L. Q. 108 (1933).
s England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920); Philips
v. Newport, 28 Tenn. App. 187, 187 S.W. (2d) 965 (1945). Contra, Steagall v. Doctors
Hospital, Inc., note I supra.
9 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church, note 7 supra.
10 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §612.32. In Lubin v. Sydenham Hospital, Inc., 42 N.Y.S.
(2d) 654 (1943), however, a mother's action for damages for mental anguish due to the
refusal to deliver her child's body for burial was held to survive under the New York
statute, which provides that "No cause of action for injury to person or property shall
be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed."
N.Y. Decedent Estate Law §119 as amended, Laws 1941, c. 897. On survival of tort
actions generally, see Evans, "A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort
Claims for and against Executors and Administrators," 29 MICH. L. REv. 969 (1931).
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property concepts.11 The court compared it to actions for libel, slander,
and malicious prosecution, none of which survive under the Michigan
statute or at common law.12 It is a matter of speculation whether this
court's recognition of the action as personal, divorced from property concepts, is indicative of a willingness to acknowledge fully that recovery
should be allowed to all members of the family whose relationship to deceased is such that they reasonably may be expected to suffer mental anguish
from the tortious act. It is submitted, however, that such a course would
be proper and in accord with the theory of the action. 16

Lee H. Snyder

11 Huntly v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 201,
280 P. 163 (1929).
12 Principal case at 378, citing authority.
13 However, the impact of a recent Michigan statute requiring the consent of only
one of an enumerated group of persons for the performance of an autopsy, if more than
one of such group assumes custody of the body, remains to be seen. Mich. Comp. Laws
(1954 Supp.) §328.151.

